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ABSTRACT
In this essay I will investigate Augustine’s presentation of the relationship between time and eternity in his Confessions. I contend that Augustine understands time in the light of his doctrine of creation ex nihilo. For Augustine, time is a creature, and therefore is characteristically marked by goodness, along with the rest of the created order. As such a creature, time can be said to formally participate in divine eternity. Though such formal participation falls short of resolving the enduring speculative tensions in Augustine’s account of time in Book XI, the participation of time in eternity is performed through Augustine’s narrative itself, which situates his meditation on time. Augustine’s narrative, in both form and content, figures eternity in the temporal splendour of polyphonic and relational love. The image of divine eternity in time is thus disclosed as a thoroughly narratival one. Augustine reforms the Platonic dictum that time is a ‘moving image of eternity’ by revealing that the likeness of time to divine eternity can only be realized through a decentering conversion to the stories and voices of others, which ground his own narrative voice and account. Augustine’s conversion narrative in Books XIII and IX witnesses his turn to the stories of others, in both narrative voice and action. A look at Augustine’s conversion account occupies the final part of the present essay. By configuring his narrative as a conversion to praise, Augustine reconfigures his narrative temporality to divine eternity. He thus activates the liturgical and eschatological dimensions of human temporality.

Augustine famously begins his Confessions with acclaim to God: ‘You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you (I.i.1).​[1]​ Augustine’s acclamation raises a host of concerns fundamental to the narrative that follows: creation and our final end, praise and desire, memory and expectation. Already emerging out of this matrix is a picture of the fundamentally temporal character and narrative shape of human existence.
I will offer here an explicitly theological investigation of some of the important features of Augustine’s presentation of time in his Confessions, with special regard for time’s relationship to eternity. My argument is threefold: I first recommend Augustine’s doctrine of creation ex nihilo as the interpretative context to his understanding of time. Time is only intelligible, indeed only exists, by virtue of its relation to eternity, in which it is created out of nothing. For Augustine, time is a creature, and as such, is characterized by goodness. As a creature, time can be said to ‘participate’ in divine eternity. But seeing as this formal participation does not resolve the speculative tensions present in Augustine’s account of time as distentio animi in Book XI, I then go on to argue in the second section that the narrative of the Confessions itself enacts, or dramatically represents, the existential participation of human time in divine eternity. Augustine’s narrative thus provides a performative context that crucially situates the aporetic speculations about time that follow. In the third and final section of this essay, I turn to Augustine’s narrative account of his conversion to demonstrate how his conversion to God entails a conversion in his relationship to both human temporality and narrativity. Augustine’s narrative, in both form and content, thus figures eternity in the temporal splendour of polyphonic and relational love.

I. Time, eternity, and creation
Time and eternity might initially seem incommensurable on Augustine’s account. Regarding the temporal realm, Augustine claims in Book XII, ‘Every act of attention which undergoes change…is mutable, and anything mutable cannot be eternal’ (XII.xv.18). God, on the other hand, is understood as transcendent, eternal and immutable: ‘You are being in a supreme degree and you are immutable’ (I.vi.10), he praises God in Book I, and again in Book VIII, ‘You are eternal to yourself, you are your own joy’ (VIII.iii.8). This apparent incommensurability raises an acute theological issue: how an eternal God might relate and communicate to finite creatures.
In this section I contend that time’s creatureliness provides a clue to understanding how time is related to, yet radically distinct from, eternity. The ontological status of eternity in relation to time highlights this distinction. Speaking of God’s eternity at the time of his ascent in Milan, Augustine equates Being with eternity: ‘that which truly is is that which unchangeably abides’; but, in turning his attention to the temporal realm and its inhabitants, Augustine ‘saw that neither can they be said absolutely to be or absolutely not to be’ (VII.xi.17). It is this precarious suspension of finite creation between being and non-being, along with Augustine’s apparent stress on dissimilarity of the temporal realm to divine being and eternity, which have puzzled so many commentators.​[2]​ It is my contention that without properly understanding time’s creatureliness—that time, for Augustine, only is as created out-of-nothing and held into being by God’s eternal presence—an account of Augustine’s understanding of time will fail to do justice to time’s relation to, yet radical distinction from, eternity.
But first, some clarification in terms is necessary. Eternity for Augustine is not just ‘more time’; but neither is it ‘timelessness’ as such. Though God cannot be temporal, neither can God be ‘timeless’ in the sense that ‘mathematical entities and truths’ are, with no regard or relevance to temporality.​[3]​ Philosophical theologian David Burrell argues that the ‘metaphor of presence’ is better suited to God than ‘timelessness’, since ‘“what is” is now’.​[4]​ If time has any being, and if divine eternity is pure being, then something is lost when we translate ‘eternity’ into ‘timelessness’. And indeed, this metaphor of presence is the one Augustine relies on heavily in his presentation of divine eternity. Augustine refers to God’s eternity as an eternally present ‘Today’:
Your ‘years’ are ‘one day’… and your ‘day’ is not any and every day but Today, because your Today does not yield to a tomorrow, nor did it follow on a yesterday. Your Today is eternity…You created all times and you existed before all times. Nor was there any time when time did not exist. (XI.xiii.16)
This understanding of God’s transcendence as eternal presence clues us into the key for Augustine’s understanding of the relation between time and eternity: his doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 
For Augustine, time is a creature, created by God in eternity out of nothing. In Book XI, Augustine makes this clear: ‘You [God] are the originator and creator of all ages…what times existed which were not brought into being by you?...You have made time itself. Time could not elapse before you made time’ (XI.xii.14). Creation is emphatically not, for Augustine, a temporal process, but rather, as Janet Soskice puts it, ‘a biblically-inspired piece of metaphysics’, the relation that ‘establishes a true link between the temporality of the world and the eternality of God’.​[5]​ As a creature, time can be said to formally ‘participate’ in divine eternity, and is unintelligible outside of the divine eternity that sustains it in being. Indeed, as Paul Ricoeur notes, Augustine’s reflections on time in Book XI only make sense within the entire context of Augustine’s meditation, which is ‘indivisibly concerned with eternity and time’.​[6]​ Keeping in mind this picture of eternity and its creational relation to time, I now turn to Augustine’s speculative remarks on time in Book XI in order to address the lingering dilemma of just how creaturely time might relate to divine eternity. 
	Just what kind of creature is time? In Book XI Augustine says that time is ‘simply a distention’ (XI.xxvi.33). How to unpack this claim is a matter of much contention, but I would want to say for now that there is a metaphysical claim at stake here: that time only exists intelligibly by dint of its relation to an eternal presence. Time cannot be atomized, because there is no stuff that it is ‘made of’; it is made of nothing, and has real being only by the gift of divine eternity. Past, present, and future, however we understand these tenses phenomenologically, have no separate metaphysical existence outside such presence. 
Yet here we find an equivocation on ‘presence’, and risk conflating temporal into eternal presence; though a person in memory or expectation suffers a ‘distension or stretching in feeling and in sense perception’, with God, Augustine claims, ‘it is otherwise’ (XI.xxxi.41). Such an equivocation, Burrell argues, ‘could only be resolved by articulating the sense of “present” proper to an eternal present, along with its relation to the present of tensed discourse—“what is the case”—both of which lie quite beyond one whose discourse is tied to tenses’.​[7]​ This gap is between ‘our tensed discourse, and a now which never becomes the past’. ​[8]​ But if our language is ‘distended’ and so ‘tensed irremediably’,​[9]​ to sort out this equivocation seems speculatively impossible. Eternal presence, on Augustine’s account, is both like, and radically un-like, the human modes of inhabiting temporality. Augustine’s view of time as distention acknowledges squarely the gap Burrell mentions between our equivocal notions of presence without pretending to resolve it.
Perhaps there is a clue to how we might navigate this impasse in the narrative situation of these reflections in the Confessions. Paul Ricoeur, in his phenomenological analysis of Augustine’s meditations on time, casts temporality in its fundamental opposition to eternity. He argues that the dialectic of ‘intentio-distentio’ is ‘a dialectic within time itself, one that is taken up again in terms of the contrast between eternity and time’.​[10]​ Thus, ‘distentio becomes synonymous with dispersal into the many, intentio with the fusion of the inner man’.​[11]​ But however appealing such a dialectic opposition may seem, it is potentially misleading for an understanding of Augustine’s presentation of time, and difficult to reconcile with the narrative form of his Confessions. If the distentio of human temporality leads us away from God, why would Augustine choose to represent his quest for God and his memory of grace in the form of a narrative that is predicated upon the intelligible organization of events in temporal succession? It is precisely by virtue of time’s creatureliness, and by extension, its creaturely goodness, that Augustine seeks and praises God in narrative time, which intensifies his human temporality rather than speculatively resolving or transcending it. Even if Augustine speculatively stresses the ontological difference between time and eternity, such a stress throws into relief Augustine’s belief in time’s creaturely goodness. If time is a creature, then a formal feature of time is its goodness: ‘Our God has made “all things very good”’(VII.xii.18).
If we follow Augustine’s lead, we must ensure the radical transcendence of God, and its corollary of the unlikeness of time to eternity. But insofar as we insist upon this distinction, we also must not forget that time is touched and sustained by eternity, the beginning and end of time. ‘Continuity and discontinuity between God and creation’, as Rowan Williams reminds us, ‘are thus very hard to pull apart in Augustine’s thought’.​[12]​ John Cavadini asserts that Augustine’s meditations on time are meant to fix our minds on the point of declension from his ascent, that we might come to see how we resist being fixed in God’s eternal presence.​[13]​ But it is the very potency of time’s resistance to eternity that alerts us to time’s existence as a gift.​[14]​ Indeed, as Cavadini argues, this resistance does not mark our ‘fall’ into distended time; rather, we fall by trying to ‘escape’ time.​[15]​ Time is infinitely other than God, yes; but God gives time its very existence. Time is thus suspended between pure potency and pure act. This suspension discloses time’s existence as a gift whose being is only actualized in the dynamism of further giving and sharing with others. This dynamism cannot be comprehensively articulated in propositional form, just as the aporetic relationship between time and eternity cannot be speculatively disentangled and determined, all tensions resolved. Rather, the dynamic manner in which time can be said to participate in divine eternity is demonstrated through its performance in Augustine’s narrative.

II. The goodness of narrative
The tensions in Augustine’s account of time in the Confessions seem to permit no ultimate speculative resolution that would make comprehend the manner of time’s participation in eternity. But Augustine, I suggest, dramatically represents the existential participation of human time in divine eternity through his narrative.​[16]​ If the tensions of time sketched above demand narrative response, Augustine’s understanding of time as a creaturely distentio—as only intelligible, indeed only in existence at all, by virtue of its relation to eternal presence—sanctions narrative representation as a means of imagining eternal presence in time.
For Paul Ricoeur, time only ‘becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal experience’.​[17]​ If time is a good creature, then narrative, which represents temporal events and relations in intelligible order, is also potentially marked by goodness, and thus is ‘sanctioned’ as a way for humans to relate the created temporal order to divine eternity. Narrative is, in Ricoeur’s terms, the ‘organizing principle of intelligibility’ by which Augustine meaningfully orders and represents relationships and events of his life, recast in the light of divine eternity. If, as Rowan Williams maintains, for Augustine ‘creation shares or participates in God by being a coherent system’,​[18]​ then creation can realize its likeness to God in the temporal harmony of Augustine’s narrative, through which dispersed events and human relationships are recuperated and ordered into coherence, and offered back to God in praise. Narrative time thus acquires a sacramental shape: the narrative interplay between time and eternity results in the intensification of time, not its abolition.
I’ll discuss how Augustine actualizes this narrative participation in two related ways: by configuring his narrative as prayer and longing for divine eternity, and by dramatizing the narrative of his conversion as a conversion into a temporality that reflects or re-presents eternity through the unfolding of relational love in both form and content.
Underpinning the following discussion of Augustine’s narrative and the relation of his narrative display of temporality to eternity is his doctrine of the imago dei: ‘you [God] made humanity in your image’ (VI.iii.4). Augustine’s narrative reveals the likeness of humans to God not as some hidden part of themselves or of each solitary individual. Instead, this likeness is revealed as our relatedness to others and to God as expressed in the polyphonic harmony of love. For Augustine, as John Milbank points out, ‘the first key analogical term is not the soul at all, but love’, which is triune.​[19]​ Augustine’s narrative does not reflect eternity by way of sheer introspection into the soul. While Taylor argues that Augustine, in his Confessions,​[20]​ makes a decisive turn inward, I think it is precisely the frustration of this interiorization, and the subsequent oblation outward of Augustine’s self, that leads him more deeply into narrative time. This oblation outward, reflected in the content of the story Augustine recounts and the form of his narrative discourse, testifies to the mediation of God’s grace through others and their stories. Augustine’s thus narrative testifies to the Platonic dictum that time is ‘a moving image of eternity’.​[21]​ But Augustine’s narrative reveals that this likeness can only be realized in the polyphony of the voices and stories of others that ground his own voice and story. Augustine thus gives this expression ‘a little more edge and definition…in the idea that God is imaged or reflected in the “desire” of things for the divine stability’.​[22]​ Locating time’s divine likeness in its reflection of the desire for eternity, as Rowan Williams does here, captures the dynamic quality of time’s reflection of eternal life. Temporal creation, according to Williams, ‘tells us most about God when it is most clearly different rom what we conceive to be the divine nature; it speaks of God by being temporal and changeable, a process of endless adjustment that still remains capable of being thought and talked about coherently’.​[23]​ Augustine’s narrative actualizes the ecstatic character of time​[24]​ and reveals the image of God in the many-voiced splendour of temporality, an image realized in the self-giving oblation of love.
Augustine’s narrative realizes this image in both form and content. One way in which Augustine’s narrative temporality ‘cleaves’ (XII.xi.13) to God’s eternity is through its saturation with Scriptural quotations from the Psalms.​[25]​ Such quotations, of praise, lament, and longing, serve as cables by which narrative time is tethered to liturgical time, the life of the church that is grounded by divine eternity. The psalms express in prayer the ‘eschatological shape of time’, as Denys Turner argues. Prayerful expectation actualizes hope: it ‘grasps all time as eschatology’.​[26]​ 
By interspersing Scriptural quotations, especially those of the Psalmist, into his narrative, Augustine also decenters any solitary narrative voice; thus the eschatological yearning of human time is disclosed as a collective and relational desire. Augustine’s conversion account similarly displays a decentering of his narrative voice. Just as the event of Augustine’s conversion is mediated by the stories and voices of others, Augustine’s narrative voice also gives way to voices and stories of others, in praise and thanksgiving. Temporality discloses its likeness to eternity through narrative time, insofar as it reflects the divine life of the Trinity—a love so radically relational and reciprocally constitutive that it exceeds our notions of unity and multiplicity. Augustine’s narrative reveals that one can participate in eternity in time only insofar as one’s narrative voice is decentered and relational. Augustine’s narrative realizes time’s likeness to eternity in the surrender of his roles as ‘protagonist’ on the level of story, and as univocal ‘narrator’ on the discursive level. Thus, Augustine’s Confessions reveal our imago dei to be a thoroughly narratival, and thus relational, representation of eternity in time.

III. Conversion, love, and temporality 
Augustine’s narrative turn to other voices is dramatized most notably in Book VIII-IX. As I will argue with reference to Book VIII, which recounts Augustine’s conversion to God, Augustine’s conversion entails, and his narrative account dramatizes, a conversion in his very relationship to time. An analysis of these Books will occupy the remainder of this essay. In these Books, Augustine does not only surrender his role as protagonist in his own story by foregrounding the goodness of others in his remembered past. He also shifts his narratival attention to the stories of others’ lives. He intersperses stories of their conversions and embeds stories they tell of the transformations of others in his own story. Stories about, and told by, his friends, his mother, and his mentors are incorporated in Augustine’s narrative, and thus decenter his narrative voice.
But prior to Augustine’s conversion account, Augustine has continually rejected the goodness of temporality. He admits such rejection in Books VI and VII. The first tactic Augustine employs to escape time is introspective ascent. In Book VI, Augustine laments the duration of time that has passed since ‘the nineteenth year of my life, when I began to burn with a zeal for wisdom…and here I was already thirty, and still mucking about in the same mire in a state of indecision’ (VI.x.17). But Augustine tries to extract himself from this mire by unsuccessfully withdrawing himself from time altogether, through a Plotinian ascent. Upon his ascent at Milan, Augustine tells us that he has confronted the infinite chasm between non-being and Being: ‘I found the unchangeable and authentic eternity of truth to transcend my mutable mind’ (VII.xvii.23). But this transcendence prompts Augustine’s recognition of the truth of God’s creation: that all things ‘are because they come from you’. And though Augustine finds himself in a ‘region of dissimilarity’, ‘it was made clear to me that you made all things good…and all things taken together are very good’ (VII.xiii.18). Augustine here realizes the goodness in all creation. Temporal existence is good, not in spite of time, but precisely because time is made by God. But to reflect this goodness demands an ethical shift in Augustine’s narrativity. He must be ‘converted’ from withdrawal from time into the splendour of a deepened temporality, into narrative relationship with others in the image of eternity.
Books VIII-IX dramatize the shift from Augustine’s refusal of time to his embrace of time. In Book VIII, Augustine continually postpones the conversion of his will to God. Although this procrastination looks like deferral to the future, it is more emphatically a clinging to the past and a skirting of the present, and thus a denial of the eschatological constitution and orientation of time and the opportunity to attend to the revelation of eternal presence in time. In this, procrastination fundamentally opposes conversion.
Augustine confesses this postponement of his conversion; though he had ‘discovered the good pearl’, he delays its purchase: ‘to buy it I had to sell all that I had; and I hesitated’ (VIII.ii.2). This hesitation prompts Augustine to visit Simplicianus. Simplicianus tells Augustine of Victorinus’ conversion and his public profession of faith, a story which Augustine recounts at length, since it ‘gives occasion for me to confess to you [God] in great praise for your grace’ (VIII.ii.3-5).​[27]​ Just as the crowd rejoices and exalts Victorinus upon his confession, so Augustine participates in their praise by incorporating Victorinus’ story into his narrative, and by celebrating Simplicianus and Victorinus’ mediating role in his own conversion.
Hearing Victorinus’ story, Augustine ‘was ardent to follow his example’ (VIII.v.10). But his ‘old will’ has still not been overcome; he is caught in ‘sweet drowsiness’ (VIII.v.10-11), and so defers his conversion yet again: though God beckons him to ‘arise’ into Christ’s resurrectional light, Augustine ‘had no answer’ except, ‘just a little longer, please’ (VIII.v.12). A surprise visit from Ponticianus, who tells the conversion story of Antony the Egyptian monk, inspires Augustine, too, but reminds Augustine of the manner in which he has ‘put off’ the quest for divine wisdom, and a life of chastity: he then famously recalls, how as a young man, he prayed to God, ‘Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet’ (VIII.xvi.17).  He has postponed indefinitely. He waits for God to seize him in an instant and deliver him from time. But such an attitude betrays a mistaken understanding of time’s goodness and eschatological relation to God’s eternity. God is to be sought not apart from time, but through time, in relation to other finite creatures.
This postponement amounts to a rejection of the relationship of time to eternal presence secured by time’s creation out of nothing in eternity. Such presence is disclosed for creatures in the narrative shape of loving attention and relationship. The fact that Augustine’s conversion follows such desperation and hesitation attests to the importance of the reception of such love from others for its delivery. Augustine’s conversion does not happen in isolation, but is a social event, initiated and mediated by others. In the garden, Augustine is called by an undetermined voice to ‘pick up and read’ (VIII.xi.29). The event of his conversion is shared with his friend Alypius and, immediately after, communicated to Monica. Alypius’ presence, Augustine remembers, did not intrude on his privacy (VIII.viii.18). Augustine returns from the garden to Monica, who is apparently inside the house. Augustine’s conversion thus is represented as simultaneously social and utterly intimate. Earlier in his Confessions, Augustine has intensely looked forward to enlightenment from false messiahs like the Manichean Faustus (V.vi.10). But ultimately, his conversion is shared not with esoteric philosophers, but with those nearest him: his friends and family. Augustine narrates his conversion to us to celebrate God’s providential grace as mediated by and through others. Augustine’s conversion narrative displays the image of eternity in time as the selfless attention to the voices and stories of others, in narrative form and content. 
Upon his conversion in Book VIII, Augustine expresses his disorientation in the opening of Book IX: ‘Who am I and what am I?’ (XI.i.1). His identity appears groundless. But this is just the groundlessness of his individual existence, which is actualized, as Book VIII has dramatized, through his recent conversion to communal relationship. In Book IX, rather than try to fix this ‘moving image of eternity’, Augustine further intensifies this temporal dynamism. In light of his conversion, Augustine can no longer be properly identified as the ‘protagonist’ of his story. This is a role he has surrendered to Christ, in and through surrendering it to those who have mediated his conversion and now constitute his very identity as members of Christ’s ecclesial body. He has done so by foregrounding their stories and successes in praise and thanksgiving. Augustine’s decentered narrative attention is exemplified in Book IX, as he narrates his mother Monica’s life and death, and opens her request for recollection at the altar to the prayers of his readers.
 In Book IX, Augustine represents perhaps the most significant of these sacrifices of his narrative voice and ‘protagonicity’ in dedicating substantial narrative attention to Monica’s story, to the story of his mother’s life and death. This story is preceded by an update on the lives of Nebridius and Verecundus, Augustine’s friends. Augustine offers a petitional prayer for God’s consolation and mercy to be shared with them, especially in light of Verecundus’ baptism in the last moments of his life: ‘repay him, Lord, at the rewarding of the just’ (IX.iv.6). For Nebridius and Verecundus, Augustine adopts the mediating role that others had played in his own life. He has eagerly anticipated their conversions and has longed for their baptism and salvation. These stories anticipate Augustine’s telling of his own baptism, which is a plural, not a singular, affair, as Augustine is baptized with Adeodatus and Alypius (IX.vi.14).
Augustine then abridges ‘many events’, for he writes ‘in great haste’. This detail offers a glimpse into the texture of Augustine’s writing: no longer procrastinating, he strains on, probing the eschatological fullness of time. But what he does not pass over is his mother’s death at Ostia (IX.viii.17). Augustine incorporates within his recollection of her death a narrative of her life, from beginning to end (IX.vii.17-IX.xiii.36). In recollecting the story of the life and death of his mother, whom he acclaims as God’s ‘handmaid’, Augustine praises God (IX.xii.33). He also recalls her dying request for remembrance at the altar: he hopes that ‘as a result of these confessions of mine may my mother’s request receive a richer response through the prayers which many offer and not only those which come from me’ (IX.xiii.37). Monica’s prayer invites Augustine’s Eucharistic participation in both her memory and the memory of Christ. His Eucharistic promise thus serves as another ‘cable’ that tethers Augustine more deeply to time, and simultaneously ties his narrative to eternity. Monica’s prayer ‘knots’ Augustine’s narrative to Christ’s Eucharistic body. This Body mediates time’s eschatological participation in eternity. 
This sacramental participation of time in divine eternity is made possible in the first place, I have argued, by Augustine’s doctrine of creation, which his understanding of Christ’s Incarnation: as Herbert McCabe has argued, the story of Jesus’ life is ‘nothing other than the triune life of God projected onto our history, or enacted sacramentally in our history, so that it becomes story’. ​[28]​ So, insofar as temporal existence is converted so as to represent the image of Christ’s selfless out-pouring of Trinitarian love, it not only manifests its creaturely goodness, but also can be said to participate in divine eternity through such narrative reflection of Christ. Christ’s Incarnation does not resolve the enigmas of time, but re-defines the speculative tensions in terms of mystery: in Burrell’s words, ‘the “truth of things” remains a mystery though not a surd; a surfeit of intelligibility rather than a lack thereof’.​[29]​ This Christic shape of time cannot be speculatively comprehended, but only narratively represented and performed, reflected in the cruciform and polyphonic dynamism of self-giving Trinitarian love. As John Milbank argues, Christ ‘restored the true process of time; Christ is time, and in receiving Christ we do not resolve the aporia…but we discover that we are to ‘comprehend’ time as the mystery of the possibility of charity’.​[30]​ It is for this reason that Augustine must respond to the aporia of time the way he chooses to, by story: eternal love can only be unfolded for finite creatures in narrative time.

Conclusion
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